Corruption, or worse, strikes again in PLA

The latest victim is Admiral Miao Hua, Director of the Political Work Department. Backing up a statement by Ministry of National Defense (MND) spokesperson Senior Colonel Wu Qian on 28 November, the MND published a terse statement saying Miao was "suspected of serious violation of discipline". It continued, "According to the decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Admiral Miao has been suspended from duty, pending investigation."

Miao, who is in the top-level, six-member Central Military Commission (CMC), was reportedly detained on 9 November. By the time such investigations become public, conviction is certain. However, it is extremely odd for the MND to announce such a thing rather than the corruption agency.

Lyle Morris, of the Asia Society Policy Institute's Center for China Analysis in the USA, commented: "Since the six-member CMC was announced at the 20th Party Congress in October 2022, two have been placed under investigation: Li Shangfu and Miao Hua. This alone constitutes a major failure for Xi's most trusted PLA leaders, who are thoroughly vetted beforehand."

Whilst Miao wore a navy uniform, his background was mostly in ground forces facing Taiwan. Indeed, his postings in Fujian Province coincided with Xi's administrative time there. Being a protege of Xi allowed him to transfer to the PLA Navy (PLAN) to become its political commissar in December 2014. His unconventional cross-service reassignments reflect Xi's pattern of attempting to bypass established networks and to develop personal loyalty.

Miao becomes the seventh CMC member to be purged since Xi came to power. Xi personally promoted him to full admiral on 31 July 2015, and elevated him to the CMC in October 2017.

Joel Wuthnow, of the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University in the USA, explained, "Miao Hua's fall is a big deal, because he was the ultimate insider - going back to his days in the 31st Group Army in Fujian, the same time as Xi." Wuthnow also posited, "One also has to wonder, how much of this is about financial corruption, and how much is about concerns over unchecked power centers springing up in the PLA."

Charges of corruption can cover a multitude of sins, such as undermining Xi's political agenda, forming cliques and factions, not fully implementing Xi's directives, or even threatening Xi's political security. No matter Miao's actual crime, Xi seems increasingly paranoid as China's economic malaise worsens. With Miao suspended, this leaves just five people on the CMC, including Xi its chairman.

Whoever heads the Political Work Department is essentially "Mr. Party Control," since it is in charge of all senior PLA promotions. Miao's last public appearance was in October, and all his patronage networks will now be closely scrutineered.

Indeed, amidst the deadly suck of this investigative whirlpool, which of Miao's associates will be dragged under? Most prominently, Minister of Defense Admiral Dong Jun is seemingly implicated. Miao was PLAN political commissar (December 2014 - September 2017), which overlapped with Dong's role as PLAN deputy chiefs of staff (December 2014 - December 2017). Indeed, as head of the Political Work Department, Miao recommended that Dong become defense minister.

If these assertions about Dong's detention are true, and unnamed US officials claim it is, then Dong would be the third Chinese defense minister in a row to be detained. He would be following in the footsteps of predecessor General Li Shangfu who lasted just seven months in the job, and Wei Fenghe who was investigated after his retirement. Interestingly, Dong was never appointed to the CMC.

However, the MND is denying that Dong has been removed from his post, which he assumed in December 2023. The spokesperson vehemently said: "The reports in question are pure fabrications. The rumormongers are ill-intentioned. China expresses its strong dissatisfaction with such slanderous behavior."

Yet Dong has not been seen publicly since an ASEAN defense meeting in Laos on 21 November, at which time he refused to meet US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin. Dong was absent from Singaporean Vice Admiral Aaron Beng's introductory visit to China from 24-27 November, where it should have been protocol for him to meet the Singaporean.

Over the past two years Xi has been prosecuting one of the largest purges of PLA leaders in recent memory, removing at least 14 military senior personnel. The purge has targeted the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) and Equipment Development Department, but the PLAN now appears to be under the spotlight. The top two commanders of the PLARF were removed midyear, followed by the head of the PLARF armaments department Lu Hong; former PLARF deputy Li Chuanguang; and General Ding Laihang, former commander of the PLA Air Force.

It is rumored that current PLAN Political Commissar Admiral Yuan Huazhi and his predecessor Admiral Qin Shengxiang are under investigation too. Reverberations in the

PLAN are bound to be damaging, for once a thread is pulled, the sweater of patronagenetworks can swiftly unravel.

Xiao Longxu, former chief engineer of the PLARF's top research institute, was removed from office on 11 October. Others who may be caught up in Miao's detention are Wang Houbin, the newly installed commander of the PLARF, and new PLAN chief Hu Zhongming, since both were recommended by Miao. Wang Chunning, former commander of the People's Armed Police was also a colleague of Miao's, and Admiral Wang Renhua, Secretary of the CMC's Politics and Law Commission, is under suspicion.

Rumors suggested that Lin Xiangyang of the Eastern Theater Command was also arrestedand may now even be dead, possibly by suicide.

State-owned enterprises involved in arms procurement have not escaped scrutiny either, with leaders in Norinco, CASC, CASIC and CSSC all ensnared. Lyle commented: "Taken together, this is by far the largest shakeup of PLA leadership and state-owned enterprises involved in military procurement in recent memory. It suggests deep anxiety and dysfunction within the ranks of China's military, and a failure of trust between Xi and the military."

"With the reforms in 2015, Xi has attempted to stabilize what's considered an inherentlyunstable and delicate symbiotic relationship between the party and the military in one of the world's last remaining modern communist-Leninist governance structures," Lyle explained. "While such initiatives may expose more cases of graft, they have not succeeded in rooting out corruption at a systematic level. This is because deep, endemic issues in party-army relations predate Xi, and indeed they have existed since the Mao Zedong era, whereby kickbacks and buying and selling of promotions have been standard practice for decades."

Lyle concluded: "In other words, corruption in China's military is not a case of a 'few bad apples'. It's part of 'doing business' in the PLA to a much greater extent than most other military organizations around the world, where the rule of law and checks and balances can serve to expose major acts of nepotism and corruption. Despite Xi's best efforts, corruption in the PLA will endure and bedevil Xi and his successor for the foreseeable future."

Miao was supposed to be in charge of political indoctrination of the PLA, yet he himself is charged with disloyalty! What does this say about the popularity of Xi's ideology?

After more than a decade, it seems the PLA is as corrupt and ideologically suspect as ever.

Even as Xi cranks up his authoritarianism level, the problem may well get worse. It perhaps indicates that the ideals of Xi and Chinese socialism are not universally popular, and that personal greed and advancement remain the true motivators in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and PLA. Yes, Xi might still have a firm grip on power, but the elite may not be particularly enchanted and motivated by his political theory.

Christopher Sharman, Director of the China Maritime Studies Institute of the US NavalWar College, said Miao's downfall raises three questions: Why is he being removed, will his cronies suffer similarly, and what does it mean for China's navy and military? Heconcluded, "While details continue to surface and many unknowns exist about the causeof Admiral Miao's suspension, one thing appears to be clear: Xi Jinping is prioritizingmilitary control and effectiveness for major missions over stopgap internal securitymeasures or symbolic prestige. Prioritizing either of those latter objectives would be farsimpler, easier, cheaper and more direct than the difficult, sophisticated work that he isvisibly pursuing - possibly amid political infighting as well."

Sharman pointed out: "Clearly, this is not about corruption per se. Graft, including promotion-related pay-to-play, kickbacks, and monetizing of (mis)managed resources, has long been a PRC system feature, not a bug. Because corruption is rampant within the PLA, investigating it primarily involves political decisions. Because the party is inherently above the law, corruption cannot be eradicated without eviscerating the system. Determined to preserve the system and secure his legacy at all costs, Xi instead strives to impose loyalty, control and ability to execute top-priority military operations -above all, against Taiwan. His core message: nobody is exempt from these unforgivingimperatives."

Miao's actions or influence were obviously a serious enough threat to Xi to warrant these embarrassing optics of yet another high-profile arrest. What is more, these characters were appointed by Xi himself. What does this say about his judgement of character, his ability to select personnel, his decision-making and fitness to rule? Xi's authority andprestige are further damaged, and it gives more ammunition for anti-Xi forces within the CCP's upper echelons.

Cai Shenkun, once a reporter for Guangdong's Southern Weekly journal and with a strong track record of predicting developments before they become public, believed Miao lost Xi's trust in part through excessive cultivation of a personal network. CCP leaders have always been concerned about factionalism or "mountaintopism", where officials develop their own power centers.

Wuthnow speculated that Miao's replacement might be Zhong Shaojun, currently Director of the General Office of the CMC. Despite this trauma, Xi remains laser-focused on meeting his 2027 centennial military building goal, and he seems willing to endure short-term setbacks if it ensures this overarching goal is met.

Indeed, Dr. Andrew Erickson, Professor of Strategy at the US Naval War College, commented: "Make no mistake, however: enduring corruption within certain parameters will not stop Xi from preparing for, or even waging, war. The totalitarian levers he holds in the CCP system can mobilize and concentrate resources and personnel dramatically, which CCP leaders have long touted as indicating their system's superiority."

Sharman added: "These are the actions of a power-obsessed but rational and formidable authoritarian leader deadly serious about preparing for, and possibly waging, major war. The CCP system suffers endemic weaknesses, including ruthless elite power struggles and the chronic official purging resurfacing now, which questions the loyalty of the PLA and undermines capabilities and readiness. The CCP system also boasts tremendousstrengths - including totalitarian means to mobilize and concentrate resources andpersonnel dramatically. This cuts both ways, deeply."

"As the ultimate product and head of this contradictory system," Sharman said, "Xi appears dissatisfied with his military and its leaders and distrustful of the sharpness and durability of the sword in his hand - but determined to hone his party army to meet his objectives through purges, reorganizations and new campaigns to strive harder. He is allowing the PLA to struggle now, while pursuing the goal of making Taiwan and its supporters struggle and surrender later. He remains large and in charge, but as a man in a hurry who is running short on time on a steepening treadmill, threatened by political enemies eager to push him off if he falters."

The American academic warned, "Churn and challenges are certain, crisis and conflict may follow. America and its allies, partners and friends must maximize their own military strengths and prepare accordingly." (ANI)