China lays legal groundwork to ready society for war

This particular law will come into effect on 1 October, and it gives Chairman Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) carte blanche to enlist any help or seize whatever resources they want from individuals or private companies in the event of a contingency such as war or conflict.

In fact, this law is something of a hangover from Mao Zedong's theory of the "people's war", for the party wants the whole nation to come together in time of crisis to fight and resist. Furthermore, it is not just about preparing the People's Liberation Army (PLA) for war, but readying the whole country for conflict.

To this end, China created the Central National Security Commission in January 2014, and it has implemented a bevvy of legal regulations to coordinate resources, to beef up national security and to prepare for war. In doing so, the CCP has shored up and consolidated power under the name of the national security apparatus.

This commission helped enact China's National Security Law in 2015, the National Intelligence Law in 2017, and the Data Security Law in 2021. These regulations give the Chinese state sweeping powers to do pretty much what it wants if it invokes the matter of national security. No citizen, no employee, no company, no organisation is exempt from the mandates of these laws.

The National Defence Mobilisation Law contains 14 chapters and 82 articles, and this represents its first update since its introduction in 2010. According to Chinese state media, the law "clarifies the functions and responsibilities of military and civilian authorities in national defence mobilisation under the new system. It also improves the national defence mobilisation system to better meet national defence and security needs, coordinate with economic and social development, and connect with emergency response mechanisms."

But what exactly is national defence mobilisation? China defines it as "activities in which the state, in response to threats to national sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity, security and development interests, takes necessary measures in accordance with the law to ensure a rapid transition between peacetime and wartime, and convert economic and social strength into national defence capabilities".

Samantha Hoffman, writing for The Jamestown Foundation think-tank in the USA, noted that the law's revisions target six areas: improving general provisions (e.g. upholding party leadership), adjusting the organisational leadership structure, improving the basic work system for mobilisation, establishing a reserve forces build-up and conscription system, improving the strategic material reserve system, and strengthening the national defence mobilisation propaganda and education system.

She wrote, "The new revisions ensure that the party leadership can, at any time, activate the full weight of the country's military, civilian, economic and social resources and direct them toward strategic objectives." If a conflagration occurs, for instance, Xi can wield national power as a single, coherent force.

At its heart, China is fusing national development and national defence interests. The 2010 law aimed to protect sovereignty, unification, territorial integrity and security, but the 2026 version adds "development interests" too. In CCP parlance, "development interests" encompass economic security, resource access, overseas assets and technological development, as well as territorial threats.

Hoffman further noted, "This change aligns the law with the 2020 revised National Defence Law, which already permits the mobilisation system to be triggered when the state's development interests are threatened, confirming that this mechanism also covers development interests."

The updated law spans things such as organisational leadership bodies and their powers, national defence mobilisation planning, the reserve and mobilisation of personnel for the armed forces, military research, and the requisition and expropriation of civilian resources and compensation.

Theresa Fallon, Director of the Centre for Russia Europe Asia Studies in Brussels, sounded an alarm on X, saying, "It is far more difficult to ignore the gathering storm of war. The National Defence Mobilisation Law of the People's Republic of China was updated on August 28, 2026, effective from October 1, 2026. This is a wartime national defence law. Has the depletion of US military stockpiles, Russia's war in Ukraine, Israel/US war on Iran tipped Xi into thinking the time is 'getting ripe'?

Despite such stark warnings, and however alarming some clauses in the 2026 law appear, most parts of the regulations are not that different from the original version. For example, the provision saying "men 18-60 and women 18-55 must perform national defence service" is a mere repetition of the 2010 law. As Lyle Morris, Senior Fellow at the Asia Society Policy Institute, pointed out, "In fact, almost all the clauses on civilian obligations to mobilise are the same as the 2010 law."

Incidentally, there is no age limit on individuals with specialised knowledge and skills who might need to be called up. Yet Morris went on to say, "There are a lot of new clauses related to Xi's role in mobilisation and data management that need to be unpacked. But folks need to stop hyperventilating about this being a new preparation for war. This preparation has been evolving for over a decade, since the 2010 law."

There are some changes, of course. Hoffman, in her report for The Jamestown Foundation, suggested the most significant changes are in Articles 3 and 16, which place the national defence mobilisation system under the auspices of the CCP's Central Committee. This is in contrast to the responsibility previously residing within the State Council and Central Military Commission. This clearly delineates that party leadership and authority trump all else.

Elsewhere, civilian resources could previously be "requisitioned", but now they can be "expropriated and requisitioned". This includes facilities, equipment, vehicles, venues or any other asset the government wants. Any refusal or delay in handing over what the CCP demands will result in compulsory enforcement and/or fines. In a similar vein, the authorities promised: "efforts will focus on ensuring strict compliance and establishing supporting regulatory systems".

China's law extends to ordinary citizens, enterprises, social organisations, strategic materials, military production capacity, professional support and any other element that China wishes to enlist into the national defence mobilisation system.

Hoffman also highlighted expanded accountability, added data and technology obligations, and broadened the scope of the organisations and individuals legally bound to operationalise the state's mobilisation goals. Indeed, the law explicitly mentions information management for the first time. It prohibits the fabrication or dissemination of "false national defence mobilisation information", which in the CCP's case may actually include truths the government does not want exposed.

Some parts of the earlier law were obsolete for sure. For example, it mentioned the PLA's military regions, but those were all abolished and replaced by theatre commands in 2016. In fact, the National People's Congress had quietly and temporarily suspended the application of some elements of the 2010 law whilst the legislation was reformed. It was always intended that the law be revised "once reform measures have matured".

Article 58 stipulates, according to Hoffman, that "units across a range of sectors are required to fulfil national defence service obligations and maintain professional support teams. These must be organised, trained and capable of fulfilling their mobilisation tasks when ordered. The full list of sectors includes transportation, postal services, telecommunications, cybersecurity, medical and pharmaceutical supply, food and grain supply, engineering, etc."

The appearance of cybersecurity on this list is an important addition. Likewise, the CCP believes the law had to change to account for the evolving character of war. For example, one part mentions that "the state promotes the application of advanced technologies in national defense mobilization, and develops national defense mobilization capabilities in emerging fields".

Furthermore, Article 64 on civilian resource use requires all organisations and individuals to consent to the forced seizure or temporary use of civilian resources (e.g. buildings, equipment, vehicles or land). A seizure procedure can be carried out by local authorities at the district level at the request of military units.

National defence mobilisation offices took over the day-to-day affairs of committees, mostly in 2022-23. One peacetime obligation is statistical surveys on mobilisation potential across the civilian and military sectors. This allows Beijing to keep abreast of developments and resources, and to keep track of any who refuse, delay or falsify such data.

Even those outside China are bound by the regulations of the National Defence Mobilisation Law. This echoes the attempted reality that Chinese laws can have a blanket application and worldwide jurisdiction. A further example of this is the Ethnic Unity and Progress Promotion

Law passed by Beijing on 1 July 2026. This new law criminalises any criticism of Chinese government policies toward Uighurs, Tibetans or other ethnic minorities, as well as religious issues.

That particular law's Article 63 has an "extraterritorial application", meaning it can be applied to citizens or even foreigners outside China. This is why travelling to China is becoming fraught, for China can at any time claim someone has broken its laws anywhere in the world. It is all part of the Xi regime's attempt to silence ideas and speech worldwide using Chinese domestic law.

Another example of this type of international jurisdiction of domestic law was the arrest and jailing of Yuen Ching-ting for two months in 2023. She was a Hong Kong student convicted of making "seditious" online posts on Facebook and Instagram whilst abroad. She was arrested after returning to Hong Kong from her university in Japan, with the authorities applying the territory's 2020 National Security Law. Her online comments had included 13 posts such as "I am a Hongkonger; I advocate for Hong Kong independence," and "As long as the Chinese Communist Party exists, how can there be a home?"

Whilst "lawfare" remains an important instrument in China's toolbox to control what people think and do, its integrated efforts to prepare society for war and struggle show no signs of abating. Indeed, the revised National Defence Mobilisation Law is just one more effort to ready the Chinese people for a potential war in the future, with Taiwan and the USA the most likely adversaries. (ANI)