Qin Gangs removal unlikely to affect Chinas foreign policy

The removal of Qin Gang from his post as Chinas foreign minister after a weeks-long disappearance fostered a few zesty rumours. Talk of affairs, conspiracies, and corruption has bounced around the net even as other policymakers have been replaced. But whatever sparked Qins fall, the impact on Chinese foreign policy and governance will be insignificantas many of the purges party rule tends to invite are.

The fall of the former Chinese foreign minister surprised many observers for many reasons. Qin had enjoyed a successful career: rising through the ranks, including at multiple positions focusing on Western Europe and the United Kingdom, and gradually building his public profile.

But, there were few apparent blemishes on his record. In 2021, Qin was promoted to ambassador to the United States over the Foreign Ministrys preferred candidate after being favoured by Chinese President Xi Jinping himself.

According to Foreign Policy, Xi was believed to appreciate Qins ability to ardently defend his perception of Chinas interests without the same abrasiveness of lesser lights such as notoriousand now bureaucratically exiledwolf warrior spokesman Zhao Lijian. It is still not known why Qin was toppled, or what his fate will be, but it came out of the blue. He was only appointed to lead the Foreign Ministry at the end of December 2022.

However, for several reasons, Qins removal is unlikely to cause so much as a ripple in Chinas foreign policy.

The first reason is the nature of the role of the foreign minister within the Chinese party-state. Foreign ministers generally do not serve within the Politburo, the 24-member Chinese Communist Party (CCP) body responsible for deliberating and setting major policies for the party-state.

Qin was not a member of the Politburo. Zhou Enlai, Mao Zedongs second, once held considerable sway as both premier and foreign minister; but since the beginning of the reform movement, foreign ministers have not had the same significance in China that they do in parliamentary democracies or that the secretary of state does in the United States, Foreign Policy reported.

Formally, the foreign minister is not even the highest diplomatic position within the party-state; that distinction goes to the director of the General Office of the CCP Central Committee Foreign Affairs Commission.

Wang Yi, who now holds the strange distinction of being Qins both predecessor and successor as foreign minister, has also retained his position leading the General Office of the Foreign Affairs Commission. In the political structure of the Peoples Republic of China, positions within the Communist Party are above state positions within the hierarchy of power.

In leading the General Office, Wang outranked Qin while he was still foreign minister. Moreover, major foreign policy decisions are all made by the president and Party chairman, who leads the Foreign Affairs Commission and the Central Military Commission. This practice that has only intensified under Xi Jinping, as per the Foreign Policy.

One of Qins key roles on his way to leading the Foreign Ministry was his time as foreign ministry spokesperson, from 2005 to 2010. He also led the Foreign Ministrys Information Department. Under Xi, a premium has been placed on personnel who defend the CCPs version of Chinas interests most vigorously. Many caustic comments that ruffled feathers abroad met with approval from superiors in Beijing.

Wang harangued a Canadian reporter for what he called her prejudice against China and arrogance and was subsequently promoted. Zhao made numerous inflammatory remarks and was promoted to Ministry spokesperson, before his subsequent demotion. And Qin himself castigated a reporter for bringing up the crimes against humanity taking place in Chinas Xinjiang province, claiming they were fabrications, before his promotion to foreign minister.

While foreign ministers play major roles in most governments and can even come to lead governments in parliamentary systems, in China the foreign ministrys most politically relevant charge is arguably public communications regarding diplomatic issues. The role it plays in strategic decisions is often more ancillary. As such, while the office of foreign minister is prominent, its occupant is disposable, the Foreign Policy reported.

Another reason why Qins dismissal is unlikely to cause major changes is Wang himself. He is an experienced figure. There is no reason to believe he will not toe the line or perform similarly to Qin. He speaks with Qins same fervency but largely avoids major pitfalls. Both men have taken an interest in supporting foreign authoritarian forces, such as Myanmars junta. Wang already served above Qin and is therefore unlikely to enact major policy changes while he occupies both offices.

A further reason there will be no major shifts in Chinese foreign policy following Qins downfall is that the demotion bears few signs of factional strife. If the Foreign Ministry changed hands and factions were to blame, that would be significant. But after more than a decade of power consolidation by Xi, as far as can be told from the outside, few forces that could rise to the level of being considered factions remain.

While wolf warrior diplomacy has become the common term for diplomats who brashly defend the CCPs perception of Chinese interests abroad, it is not a true faction but more a style that has been in favour with leaders during the Xi eraand so has been adopted by diplomats who took a more conciliatory tone in earlier times. Both Wang and Qin have occasionally displayed elements of the style but not to the point of separating them from their peers. Some foreign ministry officials may be happy at the chance for advancement that Qins rapid departure provides, but there is no sign of any faction looking to take Chinese diplomacy in a radically different direction.

Notably, as per the Foreign Policy, Qins dismissal comes at a fraught moment for Chinese power. A corruption purge is ongoing in the Peoples Liberation Army Rocket Forcea military branch that would be essential in any future Chinese military action. Further purges and bureaucratic manoeuvres silence critical thought within the party and tighten Xis powerful vise.

Most importantly, the engine of Chinese economic growth that spurred Chinas expansive ambitions for decades is sputtering. Unemployment is growing and the risk of deflation is real. Foreign investment in China is plummeting. The colossal property bubble that more than a decade ago was called the largest in history is popping. And public statistics likely offer a more sanguine view than the actual economic reality.

While Qins fall matters little individually, coming during new purges that continue to roil the governance structure, it does speak to Xis unwillingness or inability to settle on a loyal inner circle that can help perpetuate his reign. This is not always the case in authoritarian countries. Sergey Lavrov has been Russias foreign minister for more than 19 years. Bruno Rodrguez Parrilla has been Cubas minister of foreign affairs for 14 years. Xi has consistently promoted loyalists, yet those once deemed devoted insiders, such as Qin and former Vice President Wang Qishan, have often found themselves sidelined after their moment in the sun, Foreign Policy reported.

Although such changes may not always be purposeful, with disloyalty and corruption emerging and interrupting careers, the rotating cast around Xi likely advances his absolutism by preventing the formation of large factions and power bases beyond Xi himself, ensuring that power radiates outward from Xi alone. With few figures able to permanently access Xi, foreign intelligence services are also likely forced to change targets more frequently than in a more placid power structure.

Still, the perennial purges maintain a sense of uncertainty within the Chinese government as well as in those countries that engage with it. When former officials are punished through their professional and familial connections, current officials are surely more wary of forming productive working relationships. When Xi first came to power, the corruption investigations and purges helped him consolidate power. Now they are a way of life, Foreign Policy reported. (ANI)